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ESSAYS 
PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWt 
Mark Tushnet* 
During the hearings on the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to 
the Supreme Court, Senator Strom Thurmond confined his questions 
of witnesses to elicit only their views on Judge Bork's ability, integrity, 
and experience.1 During an earlier set of nomination hearings, Sena-
tor Thurmond's questions were somewhat more far-ranging. Consider 
this exchange with the nominee: "What purpose did the framers have, 
in your estimation, in referring to the incident involving former Repre-
sentative Samuel Hoar in Charleston, S.C., in December 1844, as 
showing the need for the enactment of the original version of the 14th 
Amendment's first section?" - to which the nominee replied, "I don't 
know, sir."2 One might take this as an attempt to probe the nominee's 
qualifications, but an earlier incident in the questioning makes one 
hesitate. In that earlier exchange the nominee asked Senator Thur-
mond to repeat the question, which he did, word for word, at which 
point Senator Edward Kennedy asked Senator Thurmond to para-
phrase the question. Senator Thurmond, relying heavily on questions 
prepared for him by Professor Alfred A vins, was unable to do so, and 
was somewhat irritated at Senator Kennedy's intervention.3 That 
nominee was Thurgood Marshall, who had served for four years as a 
judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
t © 1989 by Mark Tushnet. I take this title from Herbert Wechsler's book Principles, 
Politics, and Fundamental Law, published in 1961. There is a sense in which this essay consists 
simply of variations on themes set out by Wechsler. If it does, I believe that these themes are 
worth rehearing, for, as I will suggest, many scholars appear to have forgotten them. · 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1967, Harvard; J.D. 1971, 
M.A. (History) 1971, Yale. - Ed. I would like to thank L. Michael Seidman and Gerry Spann 
for their comments on this essay, with which they mostly disagree. 
1. Although the transcript of the hearings is not publicly available at this writing, I note that 
the "Minority Views," published with the Senate judiciary committee report and signed by Sena-
tor Thurmond, states at an early point, "As for qualifications, no one seriously questions that 
Judge Bork is eminently qualified by virtue of his ability, integrity and experience." SENATE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORK TO BE AsSOCIATE JUSTICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, s. EXEC. REP. No. 7, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1987). 
2. Hearings on the Nomination of Thurgood Marshall Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1967). 
3. Id. at 163. For Avins's role, I rely on an interview with Dean Francis X. Beytagh, Ohio 
State University College of Law, Columbus, Ohio, May 9, 1988. 
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and for two years as Solicitor General of the United States - a record 
rather similar in those respects to Judge Bork's. 
The contrast in Senator Thurmond's performance in hearings con-
cerning Judge Bork, whose nomination he supported, and Justice 
Marshall, whose nomination he opposed, suggests the apparently cyni-
cal view that one's position on the proper scope of senatorial inquiry 
during a nomination depends upon one's position on the merits of the 
nomination. Much has been written, usually provoked by controver-
sial nominations, about the proper scope of senatorial inquiry.4 The 
press of immediate controversy, however, diverts attention from more 
fundamental issues about the nature of constitutional government, to 
which I devote this essay. 
The idea that views on the scope of senatorial inquiry are governed 
by views on the merits of the nomination appears cynical because it 
insists that narrowly partisan concerns determine positions that ought 
to be guided by basic constitutional principle. I will argue, in contrast, 
that there is nothing at all cynical in the view that, across a wide range 
of constitutional issues, the constitutional scheme authorizes a mem-
ber of Congress to act solely with reference to his or her concerns for 
reelection - that is, to be partisan in the narrowest possible sense in 
taking positions on matters of constitutional import. I will argue that 
politics in this sense is built into the constitutional scheme, and that it 
is acceptable that principle play a role only insofar as partisan con-
cerns make principle relevant to the member's prospects for reelection. 
In constitutional law, the position for which I argue is most devel-
oped in the political questions doctrine, understood in the proper way. 
After examining that doctrine and its implications for the manner in 
which the Constitution authorizes a member of Congress to behave, I 
tum to the role of politics and principle in the confirmation process. 
!. THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS DOCTRINE 
The largest part of public policy is made through the operation of 
ordinary politics, and the reasons why the constitutional scheme al-
lows that to happen illuminate the political questions doctrine. In the 
area of ordinary legislation - bills, for example, designed to provide 
for the common defense or to promote the general welfare - the con-
stitutional scheme places no direct constraints on what legislators may 
do to serve those ends. 5 Yet, one of the fundamental assumptions of 
4. See, e.g., Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672 (1989); 
Rees, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings: Excluding the Constitu· 
tion, 11 GA. L. REV. 913 (1983). Rees provides a guide to the literature. Id. at 923 n.38. 
5. Of course, there are constitutional constraints external to the concepts of "the general 
October 1989] Principles and Politics 51 
the constitutional scheme seems to be that we should be quite suspi-
cious of arrangements that allow the exercise of power without con-
straint. 6 How then can the vast discretion lodged in representatives 
with respect to ordinary policy decisions be reconciled with that 
assumption? 
First, perhaps there are no criteria external to the political process 
against which the behavior of representatives can be measured. That 
is, perhaps there is nothing like an identifiable "public interest" 
against which legislation can be assessed. In this view, the process of 
ordinary politics exemplifies pure procedural justice: whatever results 
from the proper operation of this process is, solely for that reason, 
justified. 7 
Second, perhaps there are external criteria for determining "the 
public interest," but they are sufficiently vague that we are confident 
that the operation of ordinary politics will never lead legislators to 
adopt laws that fall outside the constitutionally permitted range. 8 In 
this view, the Constitution authorizes legislators to act with an eye to 
principle, or with an eye to their chances for reelection, or with any 
other orientation they choose; The outcome of a political process 
staffed by representatives with varying orientations and varying views 
on what is appropriate as a matter of principle or expediency is as-
sumed unlikely to violate whatever external evaluative criteria we 
might develop.9 Note, in this connection, that an orientation toward 
principle can be built into the orientation toward reelection: If a rep-
welfare" or "the common defense,'' such as those imposed by the first amendment or by the 
concepts of equal protection implicit in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. These 
constraints, however, do not operate in the contexts which this essay concerns. On indirect 
constraints on legislators, see infra text accompanying notes 50-51. 
6. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("If men 
were angels, no government would be necessary .•.. In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men ... you must first enable the government to control the governed; 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself."). 
7. This view can be associated with pluralists and social choice theorists who consider their 
work not only descriptive but normative. In the legal literature, perhaps the most prominent 
example of a purely procedural approach to ordinary politics, and indeed to most aspects of 
constitutional politics, is Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
LilO~~ . 
8. Or, at least, we are confident that they will do so quite infrequently, and we lack confi-
dence that any mechanism of policing their behavior, such as judicial review, will be more 
accurate than ordinary electoral politics in determining the occasions when they do. 
9. In situations where ordinary politics do not prevent legislators from violating the "clear" 
commands of the Constitution, political circumstances will" likely be such that the commands of 
the Constitution, insofar as they come into play at all, will no longer seem clear. For example, 
should substantial political forces ever propel the presidential candidacy of a person who was 33 
years old, arguments in favor of flexible interpretation of the presidential age requirement would 
probably become credible. For one version of this point, see M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND 
BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61-62 (1988). 
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resentative's constituents care about principle and the representative 
cares only about reelection, the representative will act according to the 
constituency's views on matters of principle. to 
The unavailability of external evaluative criteria and the general 
trustworthiness of the ordinary political process combine to allay con-
cern that ordinary politics will operate in a normatively troubling 
way. t 1 The political questions doctrine, properly understood, applies 
these same elements to matters of constitutional import. 
In saying that the political questions doctrine must be properly un-
derstood, I suggest that the doctrine is not simply concerned with 
questions regarding the proper judicial role in a system of separated 
powers, but rather deals with fundamentals of the overall constitu-
tional scheme concerning legislative as well as judicial responsibili-
ties.12 In one sense, this broader understanding of the political 
questions doctrine should be readily apparent, for when a court de-
cides that it cannot determine a constitutional question because of the 
doctrine, it necessarily remits that question to the political branches. 
The consequence of the doctrine, therefore, is that the political 
branches will decide what the Constitution means with respect to 
political questions.13 
Current formulations of the political questions doctrine make it 
difficult to identify many constitutional provisions whose interpreta-
tion is left to the political branches. 14 The following analysis begins 
with one provision that the Supreme Court has suggested involves a 
political question, but where external evaluative criteria are plainly 
available. Thus, the only apparent justification for allowing the politi-
cal branches to decide what that constitutional provision means is that 
they are sufficiently responsible in the appropriate sense. The exam-
10. This point plays an important part in the subsequent analysis. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 50-51. 
11. If one believed both that external evaluative criteria were available and that the political 
process was not trustworthy, one would have a quite different view of the output of that process. 
For an extended example, see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
12. They concern executive responsibilities as well, but that is only a tangential theme in this 
essay. 
13. The view that the doctrine deals solely with the proper judicial role looks at only one side 
of the doctrine's functions, ignoring its necessary consequences. An alternative view, that the 
doctrine is a judicial device to avoid deciding the merits of politically difficult constitutional 
questions, was given its classic articulation in A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 
183-98 (1962). Whatever the validity of that view at that time, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962), gave the political questions doctrine a sufficiently crisp formulation to make it extremely 
difficult to use for Bjckelian avoidance purposes. Those purposes appear now to be served by the 
standing doctrine. See, e.g .. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
14. For additional discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying note 17. 
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pies that follow involve situations in which external evaluative criteria 
are increasingly difficult to identify, and in which the possibility of 
political irresponsibility is increasingly large. The theme overall, how-
ever, is that only when we are confident both that external evaluative 
criteria exist and that the ordinary processes of politics are insufficient 
to constrain political irresponsibility, should we be concerned that 
members of Congress may respond to constitutional questions solely 
by considering their political interests. 
A. Examples of the Political Questions Doctrine 
1. The Qualifications of Members of Congress 
In Powell v. McCormack, 15 the Supreme Court held that the House 
of Representatives could not exclude an elected member except for 
failure to satisfy the so- called "standing" requirements of age, citizen-
ship, and residency. The Court noted that the constitutional provision 
that each house of Congress shall be the "sole judge" of the qualifica-
tions of its members might be the required "textually demonstrable 
commitment" of the question to the political branches, thus making 
the House's decision to exclude a member for failing to satisfy the 
standing requirements a political question; however, the Court found 
it unnecessary to resolve that issue in Powell. 16 
If we put the simple doctrinal point aside, 17 why might we want to 
treat a decision by the House of Representatives interpreting the 
standing requirements for membership as a political question? After 
all, there is no serious question about the existence of external evalua-
tive criteria for determining whether a member satisfies the age re-
quirement; in this regard, the age requirement is no different from the 
requirement that the President be thirty-five years old, a provision 
routinely invoked to demonstrate how easily some constitutional pro-
visions can be interpreted.18 As it happens, however, some interesting 
interpretive questions concerning the age requirement have arisen in 
the course of congressional history. For example, a member claiming 
15. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
16. 395 U.S. at 521 n.42. 
17. A "textually demonstrable commitment" might be both necessary and sufficient under 
intentionalist approaches to constitutional interpretation. Under the approach developed in this 
essay, one would identify when a provision constituted a textually demonstrable commitment by 
considering whether the political branches were sufficiently likely to be constrained by the opera-
tion of ordinary politics so that their interpretation of the constitutional provision was unlikely to 
threaten constitutional values. See infra text accompanying notes 19-32. 
18. See, e.g .• R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14 (1989); Schauer, Easy Cases. 58 s. CAL. L. REV. 399, 402 
(1985). 
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to satisfy the age requirement may not have been twenty-five when 
elected, but either reached that age between the election and the time 
for swearing in new members, or will reach it at some point during his 
or her term. 19 Suppose that the House's decision on whether these 
people satisfy the age requirement presents a political question. Surely 
the ordinary methods of constitutional interpretation - examining ev-
idence of text, intention, purpose of the provision, and the like - are 
rich enough to allow us to decide what the age requirement means in 
these circumstances, in that they define an easily described range of 
possible interpretations, each of which is reasonable. At the same 
time, however, it is exceedingly difficult to identify any threat to fun-
damental constitutional values, including the value of allowing the 
people to choose whom they wish to govern them, 20 in any resolution 
of the question .by the House. Members of Congress acting completely 
politically will serve constitutional values in an acceptable manner in 
agreeing upon an interpretation. 
When might this sort of resolution be troubling? There appear to 
be three problematic situations. In the first, members of Congress 
have base political motives in attempting to exclude a member and 
therefore adopt a completely unreasonable interpretation of the age 
requirement, one that falls outside the range of interpretive possibili-
ties allowed by the external evaluative criteria. However, it is ex-
tremely difficult to design a politically plausible scenario in which this 
possibility would occur, because the situation is essentially one in 
which members of Congress are willing to demonstrate their flat disre-
gard for reasonable interpretations of the age requirement. Notice 
also that members of Congress incur political costs by that sort of flat 
disregard of the Constitution's reasonable interpretations. The ex-
cluded member will probably belong to one of the major political par-
ties, whose other members will be alert to the threat posed by an 
exclusion based upon a completely unreasonable interpretation of the 
age requirement. Even if few people will defend the excluded person's 
political principles, some will likely point out that the people in the 
district elected the member to represent them, and should not be de-
prived of their choice on the basis of an unreasonable interpretation of 
the Constitution. The more unreasonable the interpretation adopted 
19. For examples, see L. DESCHLER, DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ch. 7, § 10, at 110 n.1 (one member took oath during second 
session of 36th Congress but may not have participated in the first session because of age; another 
took oath at age twenty-two and again at twenty-four, in 5th and 6th Congresses respectively); 
id. § 10.2, at 112-13 (senator satisfied age requirement at time of taking oath but not on date of 
election). 
20. This point was stressed in Powell, 395 U.S. at 547. 
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by the political majority, the higher the political costs are likely to be, 
and if the chosen interpretation falls outside the range of reasonable 
possibilities, the political costs may well exceed the base political 
gains. If so, the operation of ordinary politics would be sufficient to 
keep Congress from acting in a constitutionally unacceptable manner. 
The second problematic situation occurs when Congress adopts an 
unreasonable interpretation of a constitutional provision that has be-
come exceedingly unpopular or that is widely regarded as too silly to 
be complied with. As to the former, we must note that the provision 
must be unpopular, although not so unpopular as to have led to the 
adoption of a constitutional amendment. Under these circumstances, 
more than a few people will probably mobilize opposition to what 
Congress proposes to do on the ground, not that the proposal is un-
sound as a matter of policy, but rather that it should be adopted 
through the constitutionally prescribed means of amendment. If such 
opposition fails, we are likely to be confronting something on the order 
of a constitutional crisis, about which constitutional theory probably 
has nothing to say. 
A similar response is available in connection with the constitu-
tional provision currently believed to be silly. On one level, if a cur-
rent majority is strong enough to override objections to tampering 
with the Constitution by enacting an unreasonable interpretation, one 
doubts the possibility of constraining that majority. To the extent that 
the provision, for what people believe to be silly reasons, bars them 
from adopting what they believe to be sound legislation, it is unclear 
why they should be bound by a decision made generations ago. 
The most important response to the difficulties posed by unpopular 
or silly provisions, however, is that, once again, it is quite difficult to 
envision politically realistic scenarios in which unpopular or silly pro-
visions constrain Congress on significant matters. The examples that 
come to mind involve provisions like the first amendment, which may 
not be sufficiently unpopular and which is, in any event, broad enough 
to license reasonable interpretations that would permit a majority to 
do what it wanted.21 
The final problematic situation is more difficult to accommodate in 
the scheme developed here. In this situation, the elected person in-
deed does not satisfy the age requirement under one arguable interpre-
tation - for example, she was eleqted on November 4 and turned 
21. The present controversy over the constitutionality of efforts to enact a new statute to 
make it a criminal offense to burn a flag is an example of a politically significant matter involving, 
however, a constitutional provision that is not in the abstract unpopular and that can be read to 
allow Congress to enact at least some statute prohibiting flag burning. 
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twenty-five on December 12 of the same year - and members of Con-
gress seek to exclude her for some invidious reason - for example, 
because she is a woman-identified woman - using the arguable consti-
tutional interpretation as their nominal ground of opposition. Unlike 
the previous scenario, here the stated interpretation is not unreasona-
ble, but the member's failure to satisfy the requirement as interpreted 
is a fig leaf concealing the real reason for exclusion.22 It is reasonably 
clear that a member of Congress should not behave in this essentially 
dishonest way. The doctrinal analogue occurs in cases where the 
Court has declined to examine the motives of members of Congress in 
enacting legislation even though certain motivations are constitution-
ally impermissible. 23 In such situations, the member of Congress acts 
in a constitutionally impermissible way if he or she is motivated by the 
improper ground for decision. 
Yet, if the impropriety of this behavior is clear, the possibility of 
constraining it is not nearly as apparent. By hypothesis, the proffered 
interpretation of the age requirement is a reasonable one. The member 
may then use the following rhetoric to defend against charges of base 
motivation: "It's not me who acted incorrectly, but my opponents, 
who adopted an incorrect interpretation of the Constitution." Again, 
what seems to matter is that there will ordinarily be opponents of 
those who would act on impermissible grounds, who disagree with the 
position taken for reasons of their own political advantage (as when 
the person to be excluded is a member of the same political party) or 
as a matter of principle (as when they accept the constitutional princi-
ple that a person's sexual orientation is not a proper ground for exclu-
sion). As in the prior scenario, there is no guarantee that the 
opponents of those who would act in a constitutionally impermissible 
manner will prevail. Yet, the modern experience of the country rather 
strongly suggests that principled arguments have an important politi-
cal constituency,24 one strong enough to allay most concerns about the 
practical implications of treating the age requirement as one that 
22. Senator Thurmond's scrutiny of Judge Marshall's qualifications provides a possible real· 
life example. A nominee's qualifications are indeed a permissible topic of inquiry and basis for 
opposition, but it is hard to escape the inference that Senator Thurmond was really more con· 
cerned with the nominee's race than with his qualifications, especially in light of the Senator's 
inability to pursue the inquiry other than by reading an aide's questions. For additional discus-
sion of the "fig leaf" problem, see infra text accompanying note 72. 
23. For a discussion, see Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Inter· 
pretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975). 
24. Again, the controversy over the proper response to Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 
(1989), shows that there is a constituency that opposes efforts to amend the Constitution or evade 
the Court's decision because (as that constituency would put it) of a principled commitment to 
first amendment values. 
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presents a political question, at least when that constituency is joined, 
as it usually will be, by a more narrowly political one. 
2. Impeaching the President 
The preceding points about the practical political costs of constitu-
tional irresponsibility may be further illustrated by considering the . 
proposition that the Senate's action in impeaching a President presents 
a political question. As with the standing requirements for member-
ship in the House of Representatives, here too the possibility that ex-
ternal evaluative criteria are available seems rather strong. Consider 
the following situation: A President is impeached over the objection 
that the grounds charged do not constitute "high crimes and misde-
meanors" within the meaning of the Constitution. Note first that, as 
the Supreme Court has constructed the political questions doctrine in 
Powell v. McCormack, 25 this objection would not present a political 
question. The President's objection is that the Senate has adopted a 
definition of "high crimes and misdemeanors" different from the one 
adopted by the Framers, just as Representative Powell objected that 
the House of Representatives adopted a definition of "qualifications of 
its members" different from the one in the Constitution. Both Pow-
ell's claim and the President's call only for a simple interpretation of 
the Constitution, and that, according to Marbury v. Madison 26 and 
Powell v. McCormack, is just what the courts are supposed to do.27 
Despite the parallelism between the impeachment question and the 
question presented in Powell, almost all commentators believe that the 
courts should not review a presidential impeachment. 28 At the core of 
the consensus is the view that such a case would present a political 
question. Yet why should that be so in light of Powell v. McCormack? 
In this context, the view that the political questions doctrine is a de-
vice by which the courts avoid decision on certain difficult questions29 
has a great deal of force, for judicial review of an impeachment would 
obviously be extremely disruptive of the ongoing operations of the 
government.30 Still, whatever the descriptive accuracy of this pruden-
25. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
26. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
27. This is not to say, of course, that determining what the Constitution means is a simple 
task, but only that the enterprise here is indistinguishable in principle from the ordinary run of 
constitutional interpretation that the courts engage in when they deal with cases that no one 
believes present political questions. 
28. See, e.g., c. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK (1974); P. KURLAND, WATERGATE 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1978). 
29. See supra note 13. 
30. Whose orders would be obeyed in a crisis, for example, the impeached "former" Presi-
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tial or political-science account of the political questions doctrine, it 
does not treat the doctrine as one embodying a legal principle.31 
In the view developed here, however, allowing the Senate to adopt 
whatever definition of "high crimes and misdemeanors" it chooses is 
acceptable because the operation of ordinary politics is likely to con-
strain irresponsible action as effectively as any other mechanism, in-
cluding judicial review. The most obvious political dimension in the 
problem of impeachment is the party system. Members of the Presi-
dent's party in the Senate would defend against the impeachment, and 
one powerful line of defense would be that the impeachment is merely 
political - shown, the argument would go, by the fact that the propo-
nents of impeachment are acting upon a constitutionally questionable 
definition of impeachable offenses. I have little doubt that this line of 
defense would rather severely limit the range of possible definitions of 
impeachable offenses upon which the Senate could act. 32 
It is worth remembering, too, that the ultimate question is com-
parative: Are the disciplining effects of ordinary politics on constitu-
tional interpretation by the political branches or judicial review more 
likely to improve the operation of the overall constitutional system? 
Where ordinary politics fail to constrain the Senate from adopting an 
unacceptably broad definition of impeachable offenses, we could fairly 
wonder whether the courts could pull off a decision chastising the Sen-
ate for its unconstitutional action.33 In short, where ordinary politics 
fail, we may face situations in which all bets are off on the continuing 
viability of the constitutional system. 
3. Federalism 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority34 can be un-
derstood as adopting the view that objections to federal legislation on 
the ground that it intrudes on constitutionally protected domains of 
dent's - whose impeachment could be invalidated by the Supreme Court - or the putative 
incumbent President's? 
31. For a classic statement of this criticism of the view described in the text, see Gunther, 
The Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
32. Relatedly, the co-membership of the President and members of the Senate in a political 
party may make the President sufficiently sensitive to the political costs of fighting impeachment 
so that he or she would resign or work out some sort of compromise, thus effectively foreclosing 
the occasion for judicial interpretation of the Constitution. 
33. Perhaps a phenomenon like regression to the mean might operate. That is, the more 
institutions that must agree on an interpretation of the Constitution, the less likely it is that the 
ultimate outcome will be unreasonable in the relevant sense. Still, the point is that in circum-
stances where the political branches adopt unreasonable interpretations, the courts are unlikely 
to succeed in constraining them. 
34. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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the states raise political questions.35 The Court's two-part analysis 
paralleled the two parts of the suggestion made here about the struc-
ture of the political questions doctrine. 
The first part of the Garcia opinion recited the Court's previous 
difficulties in applying the test, articulated in National League of Cities 
v. Usery, 36 that federal legislation was invalid if it infringed on do-
mains integral to the interests of states "as states." In effect, the Court 
argued, its experience had shown that, contrary to the Court's belief in 
National League of Cities, there were no external evaluative standards 
against which a states' rights claim could be measured. In more tradi-
tional terms, the Court concluded that there were no judicially man-
ageable standards for deciding federalism-based claims. Notably, 
neither Justice Rehnquist nor Justice O'Connor, each of whom dis-
sented, disagreed with the proposition that the National League of Cit-
ies test .had failed; the former simply asserted that some other, 
unspecified standard could be developed to reach the National League 
of Cities result, and the latter proposed a balancing test in which intru-
sion on state interests would be relevant to the disposition of the con-
stitutional claim. 37 
There is a sense, however, in which the claim that there are no 
external evaluative standards is necessarily unpersuasive. Consider 
Baker v. Carr, 3s which first suggested the "no judicially manageable 
standards" test. Justice Frankfurter's dissent claimed that there were 
no such standards for deciding equal protection challenges to appor-
tionment, 39 to which the Court replied that standards under the equal 
protection clause were well-developed.40 Yet, while the Court pro-
claimed that such standards existed,41 it did not hold that the Consti-
tution required a rule of "one person, one vote." The Court's 
relatively rapid embrace subsequently of the "one person, one vote" 
standard42 clarifies the nature of Justice Frankfurter's objection. The 
difficulty, as he saw it, was not really that courts could not develop 
standards to evaluate legislative apportionments, but rather that such 
court-developed standards would inevitably be insensitive to consider-
35. See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
36. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
37. 469 U.S. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 469 U.S. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
38. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
39. 369 U.S. at 322 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
40. 369 U.S. at 226; see also Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (good faith effort to 
achieve precise mathematical equality required in congressional apportionments); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
41. 369 U.S. at 226. 
42. Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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ations that a more political system of apportionment would be allowed 
to take into account. 43 "One person, one vote" is judicially managea-
ble but, in Justice Frankfurter's view, bad policy. 
This episode is instructive because it demonstrates that it will 
rarely be true that external evaluative standards are completely un-
available. Some standards, albeit often rather arbitrary ones, could be 
developed with respect to almost any significant constitutional claim. 
Given this fact, however, we need to know why there is something 
disquieting about judicial administration of arbitrary standards for in-
terpreting the Constitution, in a system that takes Marbury as its 
predicate. The second element in this essay's approach to the political 
questions doctrine provides that explanation: Judicial arbitrariness is 
particularly troubling when another mechanism - the operation of 
ordinary politics - is likely to do just as good a job of constraining the 
exercise of arbitrary legislative power. 
The Court invoked this latter element in the second part of its 
Garcia analysis. Relying on Herbert Wechsler's classic argument, as 
elaborated more recently by Jesse Choper,44 the Court asserted that 
there were adequate safeguards within the operation of ordinary poli-
tics to assure that the states' constitutional interests would be 
respected by Congress.45 Dissenting, Justice Powell argued that the 
Court's position was fundamentally in tension with Marbury in its 
holding that certain questions of constitutional interpretation were to 
be left to Congress.46 Justice Powell's argument is correct, but only 
restates with disapproval the proposition that issues of federalism are 
political questions.47 Justice Powell also denied the empirical premise 
that the interests of states were in fact adequately represented in the 
43. For example, despite Chief Justice Warren's assertion that "legislators represent people, 
not trees or acres," Reynolds, 311 U.S. at 562, apportionment should sometimes be sensitive to 
interests like family farming or concentrations of racial or religious minorities because legislation 
often has a socially undesirable impact on those interests which is disproportionate to the 
number of people affected. 
44. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composi-
tion and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); J. CHOPER, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980). 
45. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551. 
46. 469 U.S. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
47. It perhaps should be noted that Justice Powell was willing in other contexts to use 
political-question language without bothering to explain why he could do so under Marbury. 
See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-92 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). For 
a particularly egregious example of Justice Powell joining an opinion barring judicial interpreta-
tion of a constitutional provision (the establishment clause of the first amendment, as to which it 
would be difficult to claim openly that a political question was presented), see Valley Forge 
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 
(1982). 
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ordinary operation of congressional politics. 48 
The empirical objection to the Court's argument in Garcia has two 
branches. First, if one examines how Congress actually works, one 
discovers that congressional sensitivity to the interests of states as 
states is relatively sporadic. Sometimes members· of Congress openly 
advert to the impact their proposals will have on those interests, and 
sometimes they do not.49 It is important to stress, however, that the 
argument underlying Garcia does not depend in any significant way 
on explicit congressional consideration of the interests of the states, 
but instead relies on structural features of the government that give 
members of Congress incentives to respond to those interests. Regard-
less of whether the members expressly address the interests of states, 
the argument goes, their political careers will tum on tht? way in which 
voters generally, or politically important segments of their constituen-
cies, evaluate what they have done. Incentive structures operate in 
complex ways, and those who feel their effects are not always able to 
articulate the reasons for their actions in terms of incentives. 50 We 
may have more confidence that the incentive structures have operated 
as they are postulated to operate, of course, if members of Congress 
advert to the interests of states as states in the course of their delibera-
tions, but it would seem to impose an unnecessary stringency on the 
political process to insist that such direct consideration appear on the 
face of the congressional record. In short, while it may be desirable 
for members of Congress to address directly questions about the im-
pact of their actions on the states as states, it hardly seems necessary 
that they do so. 
The second branch of the empirical objection to the Garcia analy-
sis is that in fact the structures presently operating on members of 
Congress do not give them adequate incentives to respect the constitu-
tional interests of states. I do not wish to enter into a discussion of 
that empirical claim here, because evaluating it would lead us too far 
into the details of federalism and away from the more general points 
about the political questions doctrine that are my primary concern. I 
simply note that, if the empirical objection is confined, as it should be, 
to this second branch, it is entirely consistent with the structure of the 
48. 469 U.S. at 564-67 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
49. Instructive case studies of congressional sensitivity are provided in Lee, The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism?: Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Decisions on State and 
Local Liability, 20 URB. LAW. 301 (1988). See also Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question 
Doctrine, 137 u. PA. L. REV. 97, 159·61 (1988). 
50. Thus, in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), the Court was correctly indiffer-
ent to arguments that no one in Congress actually said anything about the impact of a change in 
the tax laws on state treasuries. 
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argument of this Essay about the proper scope of the political ques-
tions doctrine. 
Before we take up the separation-of-powers issues implicated in 
the question of the proper scope of senatorial inquiry into the qualifi-
cations of Supreme Court nominees, a brief summary of the argument 
so far may be useful. When we consider whether we should be trou-
bled by remitting certain questions of constitutional interpretation to 
the political branches, we should first determine how successful the 
ordinary operations of politics are in constraining arbitrary govern-
mental action. This concern is particularly compelling when it is diffi-
cult to develop nonarbitrary standards by which we could evaluate the 
constitutional interpretations proffered by the political branches, but it 
has force even when external evaluative standards are available. In 
making this determination, we should be fully aware of the complexity 
of the ordinary operations of politics. Those operations include mere 
partisanship as well as incentive structures affecting people who wish 
to be reelected. They also include, however, whether as an element of 
partisanship, as part of the incentive structure, or as an independent 
factor, members' concern that they act in accordance with the consti-
tutional scheme. That is, sometimes the ordinary operations of poli-
tics produce citizens and representatives who believe that there are 
certain topics that should be placed outside the domain of ordinary 
politics. For representatives, this concern can be part of the reelection 
incentive structure, as when important segments of constituencies are 
themselves concerned with the underlying questions of principle, or it 
can simply be an independent motivation of the member of Congress. 
Finally, at least in situations in which the courts will refuse to re-
view the decisions of the political branches, we must remember the 
two serious normative problems that might arise when the political 
branches interpret the Constitution: the problem of the fig leaf, in 
which appeals to principle conceal normatively unacceptable grounds 
for decision, and the problem of the constitutional crisis, in which all 
bets are off as to the interpretation of the Constitution. The compari-
son with the political questions doctrine is designed to demonstrate 
that the adequacy of the political process is necessarily a comparative 
question: in that context, the question is whether the courts will do a 
better job than tlie political branches in interpreting the Constitution. 
In the case of the problems of the fig leaf and the constitutional crisis, 
the comparative perspective shows that no improvements may be pos-
sible over the ordinary operations of politics - except, of course, to 
the extent that a more informed citizenry would give members of Con-
gress more focused incentives to act according to principle. 
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4. Executive-Congressional Conflicts: The Scope of Senatorial 
Inquiry as an Example 
63 
The preceding analysis sheds light on questions of the separation of 
powers that have recently been controverted. For example, much of 
the literature has recently been concerned with the contrast between 
formalistic and instrumental ways of understanding the separation of 
powers. 51 In the terms developed here, the defenders of formalism 
claim that there are external evaluative criteria against which the stat-
utes enacted by Congress and signed by the President can be mea-
sured, whereas the critics of formalism point out that those evaluative 
criteria are quite arbitrary. The defenders of instrumentalism argue 
that the courts should be quite deferential to compromises worked out 
in the political process, because there is no reason to believe that the 
operation of ordinary politics provides a less effective constraint on the 
exercise of arbitrary power than does judicial review.52 The general 
analysis now can be used to examine this Essay's opening question: 
What is the proper scope of senatorial inquiry into the qualifications of 
a Supreme Court nominee?53 
Plainly, there are external evaluative criteria that can be used to 
measure the actions of a senator. As Senator Thurmond indicated in 
his questions during the Bork nomination hearings, it is possible that 
senators should examine only the ability, integrity, and experience of 
judicial nominees. Or it could be that a senator should be concerned 
with the nominee's predicted behavior should he or she be confirmed, 
and therefore could inquire into the nominee's relatively fixed posi-
tions on questions of legal theory as a basis for predicting whether the 
nominee would probably vote for or against certain positions about 
which the senator is particularly concerned. The necessity to choose 
between these two positions, or among other possible positions, might 
direct us to the usual sources for interpreting the Constitution. What 
is at stake, ultimately, is a question of separation of powers, in the 
sense that different answers to the question of the proper scope of sen-
atorial inquiry will lead to different allocations of power between the 
President and the Senate. So, to answer the question, we would ex-
amine the text of the Constitution, the history of its framing, and all 
51. See, e.g., Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions 
- A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987). 
52. For a review of these positions, see Sargentich, The Delegation Debate and Competing 
Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 419 (1987). 
53. In a later section we will consider the consequences of the conclusion that determining 
the scope of that inquiry is a political question as political questions are here defined. See infra 
section J.B. 
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·the other standard sources of constitutional interpretation. Because 
this Essay is concerned not with that particular question but with the 
analytically prior question of whether a senator is obliged by the con-
stitutional scheme to engage in that sort of examination, I will not 
review the standard sources, but note only that, as with almost all 
interesting constitutional questions, the sources appear to license a 
reasonable senator to conclude either that only a relatively narrow 
scope of inquiry is allowed, or that a relatively broad scope of inquiry 
is permitted. 54 
Supporters of Judge Bork's nomination have criticized the nomina-
tion process on the ground that it demonstrated the failure of the ordi-
nary operations of politics to constrain the Senate from improper 
interpretations of its role in the nomination process. 55 In particular, 
they have emphasized the influence of narrow interest groups in mo-
bilizing opposition to the nomination, and point as an example to the 
uniform opposition to the nomination among recently elected South-
ern Democratic senators. According to this view, these senators, most 
of whom had faced substantial opposition from quite conservative 
Republicans, had been elected by assembling a coalition of black and 
blue-collar white voters, along with a smattering of white liberals. 
The blue-collar white voters were among the strongest supporters of 
President Reagan's election and reelection, and Bork's adherents ar-
gued that senators should presume that these constituents favored 
Judge Bork's nomination. Further, the new Democratic Senators had 
campaigned on platforms that, in their emphasis on problems of law 
and order and similar "Republican" social issues, suggested that they 
ought to support the nomination. Nonetheless, the argument goes, 
they were induced to oppose the nomination, contrary to their inclina-
tions and to the inferences that could be drawn from their campaigns, 
solely because Washington-centered interest groups had mobilized 
their black constituencies and threatened to retaliate against these sen-
ators when they sought reelection.56 In addition, and not confined to 
pressure on the Southern senators, Judge Bork's opponents are said to 
have seriously distorted his record, particularly by translating his criti-
cisms of the constitutional arguments used in certain Supreme Court 
54. Compare Rees, supra note 4, at 923 ("Almost everyone ... agree[s] that probable opin· 
ions were proper criteria.") with Fein, supra note 4, at 672-73 (describing a limited "Hamiltonian 
model" for scope of inquiry). 
55. The best statement of this position that I have found is Garment, The War Against Rob-
ert Bork, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1988, at 17. 
56. Id. Of course, this story must be accompanied by criticism of the Reagan administration 
for failing to mobilize its own constituency to be persuasive in its depiction of the nomination 
fight as simply a political struggle. 
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opinions into criticisms of the results reached by the Court. For ex-
ample, the fact that Judge Bork had offered rather standard academic 
criticisms of the scope of the state action doctrine as articulated by the 
Court in Shelley v. Kraemer 57 was, Judge Bork's supporters said, 
unfairly represented as evidence that Judge Bork approved of racially 
restrictive covenants. 
This account of the nomination process can be questioned in a 
number of ways. For example, some of the Southern senators may 
have opposed the nomination because they disagreed with the way 
they thought Judge Bork would act as a Justice of the Supreme Court; 
much of the political analysis offered by Judge Bork's supporters de-
pends upon inferences from campaign positions not expressly directed 
at the issue of Supreme Court confirmations, and imputations of mo-
tives to senators who articulated their positions rather differently. The 
political analysis cannot account for the fact that a highly conservative 
Southern senator, John Stennis of Mississippi, voted against the 
nomination, for well before the vote was taken he had announced his 
intention to retire from the Senate, and therefore could not have been 
concerned about alienating potential voters. In addition, the adver-
tisements with the greatest number of alleged distortions of Judge 
Bork's record were not very widely distributed, 58 although they were 
disseminated "inside the Beltway," where, presumably, most Senators 
saw them and perhaps gained an inaccurate impression not only of 
Judge Bork's record but also of the extent of opposition to that pre-
sumed record. Finally, sometimes tµe distinction between criticism of 
opinions or theories and criticism of results rang hollow, as when 
Judge Bork, who claimed to criticize only the Court's opinion in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 59 was unable to provide Senators with a constitu-
tional analysis that he deemed acceptable to reach the Griswold 
result.60 
For present purposes, however, I do not want to engage these crit-
ics of the nomination process on whether their political analysis is per-
suasive. Rather, we should note the exact nature of their objection: 
that the nomination process was vitally affected by the ordinary opera-
tions of politics. Surely no one would think it strange or constitu-
57. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
58. See Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, IOI 
HARV. L. REV. 1213, 1221-22 (1988). 
59. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating as an unconstitutional invasion of privacy a Connecti-
cut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives). 
60. For a brief mention of this exchange (which does not, however, cite the precise matter 
described in the text), see E. BONNER, BATILE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION 
SHOOK AMERICA 269 (1989). 
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tionally imprope~ for a senator to vote for or against a tax measure 
because important segments of his or her constituency would consider 
that vote in deciding whether to support the senator's bid for reelec-
tion. What the critics of the nomination process imply, therefore, is 
that it is in some sense constitutionally improper for ordinary politics 
to play a role in the confirmation process. 61 
· The confirmation process is, of course, one aspect of the constitu-
tional system of the separation of powers. Therefore, it is important to 
consider the extent to which the operation of ordinary politics is a 
feature of the constitutional allocation of powers between the Presi-
dent and the Senate. We know from the language of the Constitution 
what the Senate is to do with a nomination: it is to advise and con-
sent. Yet, the language of the Constitution does not say how the Sen-
ate should do that - by examining only the nominee's ability, 
integrity, and experience, or by inquiring more broadly into the nomi-
nee's political and social views. 
When we look beyond the text of the Constitution, we will dis-
cover a tension in the other sources of constitutional interpretation. I 
focus on The Federalist Papers, in part because the tension is easily 
described by reference to different numbers in the Papers. 62 As Bruce 
Fein has shown, when Hamilton addressed directly the question of the 
Senate's role in the nomination process, he characterized it as rela-
tively limited. 63 In my terms, Hamilton offered external evaluative 
criteria to guide the Senate's action, and those criteria were concerned 
primarily with the nominee's ability, integrity, and experience.64 Else-
where, however, The Federalist Papers generally seem to make the op-
eration of ordinary politics the linchpin of the system of separation of 
powers. The most celebrated general discussion of the separation of 
powers occurs in The Federalist Number 51, in which Madison writes 
that "[A]mbition must be made to counteract ambition" and that the 
"interest of the man must be connected to the . . . interests of the 
61. Two qualifications come immediately to mind. First, perhaps the objection is that it is 
constitutionally improper for ordinary politics to have played as large a role as it did in the Bork 
confirmation process. I find it difficult to determine how to measure the extent of the influence of 
ordinary politics, and I doubt that much turns on whether the issue is stated as an absolute or as 
one of degree. Second, it is important to stress that the objection is to the operation of ordinary 
politics in the confirmation process. It would be difficult to defend the proposition that the Presi-
dent acts in a constitutionally questionable manner in considering political favors when deciding 
whom to nominate. This merely demonstrates, once again, that the issue is basically one of the 
allocation of power between the President and the Senate; that is, that we are dealing with a 
question of the separation of powers. 
62. Perhaps this is because the different numbers were written by different authors. 
63. Fein, supra note 4, at 672. 
64. See THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 405 (A. Hamilton), & No. 78, at 471 (A. Hamilton) (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961). 
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place."65 The latter statement, in particular, appears positively to re-
vel in the claim that the separation of powers operates by mobilizing 
ordinary politics: The interests of a senator are in, among other 
things, reelection, and they connect with the interests of the place by 
giving the senator an incentive to stand against the President, letting 
the senator's ambition for reelection counteract the President's ambi-
tion for, among other things, making a mark on the Supreme Court. 
The tension in The Federalist Papers can be reduced in several 
ways. First, we must understand that the Papers were documents 
designed to persuade people in the midst of a highly contested struggle 
for adoption of the Constitution. They had to operate on two levels, 
describing both the way the new national government would function 
in general and the way the authors believed things would actually 
work once the new government was in place. Thus, given what they 
knew about their society, Madison and Hamilton might well have be-
lieved that, if the confirmation process were left to the operation of 
ordinary politics, senators would confine their inquiries to integrity, 
ability, and experience. But, they were also experienced enough to un-
derstand that their predictions about the specific operations of govern-
ment might prove wrong even though they well understood the 
broader mechanisms of that government. Second, Hamilton was a no-
torious defender of expansive presidential power, and there is little 
reason to take his claims about the scope of that power in particular 
instances as overriding the more general propositions about the struc-
ture of the government offered elsewhere in the Papers. Finally, and 
perhaps most important, Madison's and Hamilton's arguments op-
erate on different levels of generality, and since Madison is concerned 
with the overall operation of the system while Hamilton is concerned 
with details, there may be good0reason to pay more attention to 
Madison's theoretical propositions than to Hamilton's specific ones. 
If we take "ambition counteracting ambition" as the fundamental 
principle of the separation of powers, it follows rather straightfor-
wardly that questions like that of the proper scope of senatorial in-
quiry are political questions in the sense offered here. They are to be 
left to the operation of ordinary politics, and there is nothing constitu-
tionally troubling about a senator whose position on that question is 
determined solely with reference to crass political concerns, for those 
concerns are part of "the interests of the man." It should be empha-
sized once again, however, that to say that there is nothing constitu-
tionally troubling about such a senator is not to say that he or she acts 
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
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in an admirable manner. It might be better if senators were less con-
cerned about reelection and more concerned about principle - even if 
taking a principled stand reduced their chances of reelection - but, I 
have argued, the Constitution authorizes a senator to act solely with 
reference to political concerns. Indeed, it might be worse if senators 
were less concerned about reelection and more concerned about prin-
ciple, for that might reduce the efficacy of the principle that ambition 
should counteract ambition. 
If this conclusion is accepted, an additional question arises: Even 
if a senator may decide what scope of inquiry into a nominee's qualifi-
cations is appropriate solely with reference to ordinary political con-
siderations, may that senator vote on a particular nomination solely 
with reference to the same considerations? Before addressing that 
question, it will be helpful to discuss some objections to the analysis as 
it has been developed so far. 
B. Objections 
Many people will doubtless be troubled by the suggestion that 
members of Congress can decide constitutional questions by referring 
solely to political considerations. It is one thing to argue that constitu-
tional interpretation should not be left only to the courts. In a system 
with multiple possible interpreters of the Constitution, though, one 
might argue that everyone who does interpret the Constitution should 
apply the same tools of principle that the courts purport to use. In 
that view, one might agree that members of Congress should interpret 
the Constitution in at least some situations and contend that, if their 
interpretations are to have weight, they should be made through a de-
liberative process in which all the relevant constitutional concerns are 
openly addressed in an informedsand even-handed manner.66 The 
view offered here is different. Such a deliberative process is certainly 
not objectionable, but neither is it required by the Constitution. In 
this approach, ordinary politics is good enough. What is wrong with 
that view? 
1. Normatively Troubling Outcomes 
The first and probably most obvious objection to this view is that it 
almost guarantees that sometimes there will be normatively troubling 
outcomes in constitutional interpretation. Consider the member of 
Congress who has a racist constituency and therefore votes to exclude 
66. See Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial 
Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 101-02 (1986). 
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Representative Powell from the House solely to appease the racists in 
his district - voters who could, he believes, provide the margin for his 
defeat in the next election. Or consider the Senator who votes against 
Judge Bork's confirmation because his constituents erroneously believe 
that Bork is Jewish. 
There is no doubt that this objection has force, and that all that 
can be done is to show that its scope in practice is perhaps more 
limited than might initially be thought. Consider three aspects of the 
previous analysis. First, we must note that the political branches are 
multi-member bodies. 67 As a consequence, other members will almost 
certainly point out the normatively troubling grounds upon which the 
senator is relying. In the context of a nomination, the President and at 
least some members of the President's party will undoubtedly mobilize 
their supporters against those who oppose the nomination on openly 
racist grounds. Other senators, perhaps less concerned about the un-
derlying principle, will nonetheless support the nomination on its 
merits. Still others, including members of the racist senator's party, 
will take a principled stand against that sort of opposition, in part be-
cause the party as a whole must appeal to a national constituency in 
which racist opposition may play less well. Considering all these pos-
sible sources of constraint on normatively troubling outcomes, we may 
be less concerned by the fact that embedded somewhere in the Senate 
some senators cast their votes for the wrong reasons. 
In the context of a nomination, or indeed of proposed legislation 
where there is no guarantee of judicial review either because the courts 
apply an extremely loose standard of reasonableness, or because the 
proposal will not be enacted, there is an additional difficulty. In these 
contexts the comparative question - ordinary politics as compared to 
what? - must be framed to compare ordinary politics to a different 
form of politics in which members of the political branches expressly 
advert to constitutional concerns in their deliberations. When that 
comparison is made, the problems of the constitutional crisis and the 
fig leaf are quite serious. 
The former problem arises when a representative's constituency is 
indifferent to or affirmatively rewards the representative's expressions 
of normatively improper positions. For example, during the long and 
unsuccessful effort in the 1920s and 1930s to enact a federal anti-
lynching law, several Southern senators and representatives openly 
67. I focus on the House and Senate in what follows, but the points are the same if we 
consider the executive branch. 
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stated their opposition to such laws in racist terms. 68 If representa-
tives were placed under a moral injunction to avoid stating such 
grounds of opposition, there might ultimately be a beneficial educative 
effect: people forced to suppress expressions of their undesirable views 
may come to believe that those views are indeed undesirable. 69 There 
are two reasons, though, to think that imposing a norm against such 
expressions is unnecessary or undesirable. First, the other mecha-
nisms of discipline - opposition from other members of the same 
party, which has its national constituency, opposition from members 
of the other party, and the like - have in the recent past proven 
rather effective in constraining the expression of normatively undesir-
able views. 70 The incremental beneficial effect of an additional norma-
tive constraint may be quite small. Second, imposing such a constraint 
is likely simply to transfer the difficulty from the domain of the consti-
tutional crisis to the domain of the fig leaf. 
The anti-lynching campaign again provides an example, because 
some of its "more respectable" opponents stated their opposition in 
terms of states' rights rather than in racist terms. As has been sug-
gested, Senator Thurmond's opposition to Thurgood Marshall's nomi-
nation to the Supreme Court may be another example of the problem 
of the fig leaf. The Supreme Court recognized the problem in United 
States v. O'Brien, 71 refusing to invalidate a statute on the ground that 
statements on the Senate floor showed that it was adopted for norma-
tively troubling reasons - to punish people who opposed the war in 
Vietnam - saying that relying on that ground would encourage sena-
tors to conceal the real reasons for their action in re-enacting the stat-
ute. 72 If, as is almost always the case, there are constitutionally 
permissible grounds for a representative's position, the problem of the 
fig leaf will be pervasive. Indeed, the Court's position in O'Brien 
makes sense beyond the context of judicial review. As citizens exam-
68. For examples, see R. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-
1950, at 64, 143, 149-50 (1980). 
69. The examples should make clear that there is a difference between a normatively trou· 
bling reason, such as racism, and a constitutionally erroneous one. It is a premise of this branch 
of the argument that there may be external evaluative standards to determine what the Constitu-
tion really means, but that does not mean that a representative who adopts a different interpreta-
tion of the Constitution acts in a normatively troubling way. This is to say only that the 
Constitution as a system of organizing a government does not occupy a fully normative terrain 
(although it may fully occupy the normative terrain). 
70. Cobler, Republican Racist, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 18 & 25, 1989, at 11, discusses 
this proposition in the context of the problems of the Louisiana and national Republican parties 
in dealing with the election of David Duke, a prominent white supremacist, as a Republican 
Louisiana state senator. 
71. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
72. 391 U.S. at 382-86. 
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ining the behavior of our representatives, we ought to regard the prob-
lem of the fig leaf as a serious one, because when fig leaf reasons are 
given on the floor of the Senate or the House it becomes more difficult 
for us to engage in an open discussion of the propriety of our repre-
sentatives' behavior. Better, it would seem, that they say openly what 
they really care about, so that we can engage them on the terrain that 
truly matters. 
Treating certain questions as political questions in the sense devel-
oped here makes sense in some circumstances, then, even if we are 
convinced that at times normatively troubling results may be obtained. 
The circumstances are those where there is no mechanism other than 
citizen outrage to constrain the representatives, as with nominations 
or legislation that fails to be enacted, and where there are both consti-
tutionally permissible arguments and normatively troubling ones in 
support of one or another position. 
2. The Slippery Slope 
A second difficulty with treating certain constitutional questions as 
political, in the sense that we will allow the operation of ordinary poli-
tics to determine what the Constitution means, is that Congress and 
the President may find themselves sliding down a slippery slope. Hav-
ing relied on ordinary politics to resolve a particular problem in a rea-
sonable way, they may become accustomed to adopting such 
resolutions. The constraining effect of ordinary politics may gradually 
be weakened, to the point that the constitutional interpretations that 
result from the operation of ordinary politics should be unacceptable. 
As Frederick Schauer has shown, though, the conditions under which 
slippery slope problems are likely to arise are fairly restricted. 73 
Justice Scalia's dissent in Mistretta v. United States 74 explained the 
slippery slope objection. The Court in Mistretta upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Federal Sentencing Commission, on which several fed-
eral judges sit, to prescribe and, as experience accumulates, revise 
guidelines for sentencing criminal offenders. Justice Scalia objected 
that the Commission's functions amounted to lawmaking and could 
not be delegated by Congress. Some delegations, he thought, were 
permissible because they were subject to the constraints of ordinary 
politics; these delegations involved the transfer of legislative authority 
from Congress to either the President or the courts, and, according to 
Justice Scalia, Congress's ambition would lead it to be cautious in aug-
73. Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985). 
74. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989). 
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menting the authority of another governmental branch, which of 
course has its own ambitions. 75 In contrast, the Sentencing Commis-
sion, as Justice Scalia saw it, was a free-standing lawmaking body, 
which drew power away from Congress without transferring it to an-
other branch: 
If rulemaking can be entirely unrelated to the exercise of judicial or exec-
utive powers, I foresee all manner of "expert" bodies, insulated from the 
political process, to which Congress will delegate various portions of its 
lawmaking responsibility. How tempting to create an expert Medical 
Commission ... to dispose of such thorny, "no-win" political issues as 
the withholding of life support systems in federally funded hospitals, or 
the use of fetal tissue for research.76 
There are a number of responses to this objection. Perhaps least 
important, the Court in Mistretta appeared to hold in reserve the pos-
sibility of invalidating a statute on separation of powers grounds where 
the resolution it embodied was simply unreasonable. 77 In the terms of 
the present essay, we might say that political questions are ones in 
which the interpretation of the Constitution is left to the political 
branches subject to the constraints of ordinary politics and judicial 
review for reasonableness. Yet, this response may be less significant 
than it seems because we would have to identify or at least speculate 
about the circumstances under which the political branches would act 
unreasonably. As Paul Gewirtz has argued, it is unavailing tO respond 
to claims about the operation of ordinary politics by devising hypo-
thetical cases in which the political branches might act unreasonably, 
unless one can identify the political forces that would lead the political 
branches to act in that way.7s 
Justice Scalia's reference to "no-win" issues is an attempt to iden-
tify such forces, but it is not terribly persuasive. He fails to appreciate 
that, once we understand how we ought to define such issues, there are 
exceedingly few of them. Justice Scalia's enumeration suggests that by 
a "no-win" issue he means one in which the operation of ordinary 
politics is paralyzed because no votes can be gained by taking a posi-
tion on the issue, some resolution is necessary, and responding to pa-
ralysis by delegating authority is therefore likely to produce bad public 
policy.79 But, there are likely to be few such issues because representa-
75. 109 S. Ct. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
76. 109 S. Ct. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
77. 109 S. Ct. at 659-60. 
78. Gewirtz, The Jurisprudence of Hypotheticafs, 32 J. LEGAL Eouc. 120 (1982). 
79. It should be noted that "no policy" constitutes a policy of nonregulation, and that Justice 
Scalia must therefore have in mind issues as to which the resolution arrived at by people doing 
what they believe best yields unsound policy. 
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tives can gain votes by being principled per se, that is, by presenting 
themselves to their constituents as concerned with the proper resolu-
tion of controversial issues even if there is apparently little electoral 
advantage in the position they take. so In addition, of course, there are 
representatives who are truly principled, that is, who are indeed com-
pletely indifferent to the electoral consequences of their actions.81 
Recent experience indicates why there are so few "no-win" issues 
as defined in a way relevant to the discussion in this essay. In several 
recent situations electoral pressures have led Congress to act in ways 
that produce what almost all members believe to be bad public policy. 
There has been general agreement, for example, that there are too , 
many military bases in the United States, and yet Congress was reluc-
tant to enact legislation authorizing base closings. 82 Too many mem-
bers had bases in their districts and were concerned that once a base in 
another district was closed, the one in their own would be next. Mem-
bers could believe that every base but one - the one in their district 
- was unnecessary, and yet base closings would be defeated unani-
mously. Congress solved this problem by creating an automatic mech-
anism for base closings: a commission was established to identify 
bases to be closed, and the list it produced had to be accepted or re-
jected in its entirety. 83 The sense in which it had to be accepted or 
rejected in its entirety is important, though. As a matter of formal 
law, nothing prevents a later Congress from repudiating the commit-
ment a prior Congress made to act on the list as a whole. 84 If Con-
gress adheres to that commitment, it is because members of Congress 
believe at present that, given the operation of ordinary politics, they 
will benefit by acting on the list as a whole. Yet, adhering to a 
precommitment of that sort can itself become a political issue. Con-
gress' rejection in early 1989 of a pay increase for high federal employ-
ees resulted in part from the injection of precommitments into 
80. Perhaps a legislator can lose votes by acting in a principled way, when constituents criti-
cize him or her for failing to be oriented toward some result, whether or not they have a strong 
preference for a particular result. In the present context, it seems likely that this group will be 
small, because the hypothesized paralysis occurs when there is a deep division in the constituency 
over what the proper result is. 
8 I. Such indifference might occur, for example, when the issue is one about which the repre-
sentative's constituency is uninformed and largely, although not entirely, indifferent, and which 
is much less important to the constituency than many other issues. Under these circumstances, 
the member is in a position to cast a "free" vote, that is, one resting entirely on grounds in-
dependent of concerns for reelection. 
82. See Lamar, Taps for Old Bases, TIME, Jan. 9, 1989, at 28. 
83. Id. 
84. For a comprehensive discussion, see Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: 
Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379. 
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ordinary politics. ss 
There are additional reasons to be skeptical of the slippery slope 
objection. As this essay has stressed, some constituents care about 
principled action by their representatives, and their views will have to 
be considered when a representative confronts a proposal that might 
be a step along the slippery slope. Further, the slippery slope argu-
ment can be made by a representative's opponents, both within the 
district in the course of an election campaign and across districts in 
the chambers of Congress itself. It seems, therefore, that "no-win" 
issues in the relevant sense will be few and far between, as will, there-
fore, skids down the slippery slope. Congress may adopt statutes that 
embody unsound public policy, of course, or it may fail to adopt any 
policy when some policy is needed, but, under the constraints imposed 
by ordinary politics, it is extremely unlikely to adopt unreasonable in-
terpretations of the Constitution, at least in the contexts being consid-
ered here. The specification of those contexts, however, leads to a 
third objection to the political questions approach developed in this 
essay. 
3. The Scope of the Analysis 
The arguments in this essay have been confined to problems of fed-
eralism and the separation of powers. Yet, the third objection goes, if 
we are willing to rely upon the operation of ordinary politics to con-
strain Congress with respect to those problems, why should we not 
rely on it with respect to other problems, that is, those usually desig-
nated problems of individual rights? After all, many of the same argu-
ments, such as those deriving from the existence of principled voters 
and representatives, are available in the context of individual rights as 
well. Even more, to the extent that the analysis makes the unavailabil-
ity of external evaluative standards important, it cannot distinguish 
between individual rights and other aspects of the constitutional 
scheme. And, in light of that unavailability, the problems of the fig 
leaf and the constitutional crisis are no more severe in the context of 
individual rights than in those of federalism and the separation of 
powers. 
This objection has been noted, in different ways, by Stephen Carter 
and John Hart Ely. According to Carter, the past decade's investiga-
tions of constitutional theory primarily in the context of individual 
rights have demonstrated that there are no nonarbitrary external 
85. Gorey, The Games Congress Plays, TIME, Feb. 13, 1989, at 38; Gorey, Vote, You Guys, 
NATL. REV., Jan. 27, 1989, at 13. 
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evaluative standards against which the performance of legislatures can 
be measured. 86 If our society's commitment to the institution of judi-
cial review is to be preserved, we must let the courts act in the only 
areas that have external evaluative standards, no matter how arbitrary 
and foolish those standards may be. 87 It is not clear, though, why we 
should want to preserve the institution of judicial review under these 
circumstances, or indeed why we should be less troubled by arbitrari-
ness in these areas than in the area of individual rights. Perhaps we 
must preserve judicial review so that it will exist when we gain confi-
dence once more that there are external evaluative standards in the 
area of individual rights, but this seems an extraordinarily weak 
position. 
John Hart Ely's approach can be taken to distinguish between the 
area of individual rights and the ones of primary concern in this essay 
on the ground that ordinary politics bring with them structural imped-
iments to the full and fair consideration of individual rights. As the 
prior discussion of Garcia indicates, to the extent that there are struc-
tural impediments in the areas of federalism or the separation of pow-
ers, Ely's approach would authorize judicial review as a constraint on 
legislators. 88 I have avoided discussing structural impediments in my 
defense of the political questions approach developed in this Essay, 
because sustained examination of Ely's approach in its primary do-
main, that of individual rights, has demonstrated that it is infected by 
serious problems of arbitrariness in the identification of what will 
count as a structural impediment. 89 
It seems, then, that this third objection, that the approach devel-
oped here threatens judicial review across the board, is well taken. 
When Chief Justice John Marshall first articulated the possibility that 
there would be a doctrinal category of political questions, he believed 
86. See Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary De-
fense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985). 
87. Carter claims that the formalism in the area of separation of powers is at least less arbi-
trary than most commentators believe it to be. Id. at 853-55. See, e.g., Elliott, INS v. Chadha: 
The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. Cr. REV. 
125. Justice Scalia's dissents in Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), and Mistretta v. 
United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989), do not provide strong support for that claim. For Carter's 
views on Mistretta, see Carter, Framers Lost in Sentencing Case, Legal Times, Jan. 30, 1989, at 
21. 
88. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50. 
89. The earliest version of this criticism is Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980). Later versions are M. TUSHNET, supra note 
9, at 72-107; Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. Cr. REV. 397; Tushnet, 
Public Choice Constitutionalism and Economic Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION AND EcONOMIC 
RIGHTS (E. Paul ed. (forthcoming)). 
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that such a category could readily be distinguished from the separate 
category of individual rights: 
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, 
not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in 
which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or 
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can 
never be made in this court. 9o 
If we accept the analysis offered here, that distinction may well be 
untenable. All that can be said at this point, I suspect, is that over the 
course of 200 years of constitutional history, and within the past dec-
ade, there is not a great deal to be said in favor of the institution of 
judicial review.91 
II. THE REPRESENTATIVE'S PERSPECTIVE ON POLITICAL 
QUESTIONS 
We now turn to a brief consideration of the implications of the 
preceding analysis for the behavior of representatives who are asked to 
consider some question that the analysis leads us to conclude is a 
political question. Suppose that the question of the proper scope of a 
senator's inquiry into the qualifications of a nominee to the Supreme 
Court is treated as a political question. A senator then is free to take a 
position on that question solely with reference to electoral considera-
tions, although, as has been emphasized repeatedly, he or she is also 
free to choose a position with reference to an independent analysis of 
constitutional principle. Having determined his or her position, what 
may a senator then do in voting on the nomination itself? In one 
sense, of course, the answer to that question is self- evident. At least to 
the extent that we have treated the question as political because of the 
fig leaf problem, it follows that the senator may take a position on the 
nomination solely with reference to electoral considerations. Consider 
the senator who, as a result of electoral considerations, believes that it 
is proper to engage in a wide-ranging inquiry into the nominee's views 
on controversial questions. If we were to say that that senator must 
then vote for the nominee if those views fell within the range of re-
90. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
91. For an examination of the Court's recent exercises of the power of judicial review, and a 
comparison with Congress, see Tushnet, Schneider & Kovner, Judicial Review and Congressional 
Tenure: An Observation, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 967 (1988). The standard counter-example to 
claims about the inutility of judicial review is Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
Yet, as opponents of judicial review have pointed out, it is not obvious that 'Brown would have 
been needed had the Court not exercised the power of judicial review to invalidate federal civil 
rights statutes enacted immediately after the Civil War. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3 (1883). Had the civil rights acts remained on the books, perhaps states would have been 
less likely to adopt segregation statutes in the succeeding decades. 
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spectable professional opinion, we would once again generate a fig leaf 
problem for the senator whose constituents oppose the nominee's 
views on the merits of the controversial questions. More generally, it 
seems unlikely that we should allow electoral considerations to dictate 
the answer to one question - the proper scope of inquiry - and then 
require that they be put aside when the senator considers the inevita-
ble follow-up question, whether to vote to confirm. For the senator 
who concludes that a wide-ranging inquiry is appropriate, we would 
then come close to saying that, although you can engage in such an 
inquiry, you cannot take the answers you get into account when decid-
ing how to vote.92 The previous analysis allows a somewhat more ex-
tended defense of the view that electoral considerations may dictate a 
senator's position on the confirmation question as well as on the 
proper scope of inquiry. 
Most of the political considerations that justify treating the scope 
of inquiry as a political question apply as well to the confirmation is-
sue. They include competing interest groups, the existence of some 
principled constituents to whom the senator must respond, the possi-
bility that the senator may have a principled position on the nominee's 
qualifications, and the possibility of party solidarity and presidential 
retaliation. When these considerations are aggregated across the en-
tire Senate, there is in general little reason to believe that a nominee 
would be rejected for unconstitutional reasons. 93 On the broader level 
of "ambition counteracting ambition," selection of members of the 
Supreme Court, as much as determining the proper scope of inquiry 
into a nominee's qualifications, is a point of political struggle between 
the President and the Senate. It is therefore one of the "interests of 
the place" that both the President and the Senate may be sensitive to 
the political implications of what they do. A senator who wishes to 
emphasize that the President has failed to take adequate account of 
the political or policy dimensions of a proposed appointment is exer-
cising one of the prerogatives of office - a prerogative that, among 
other things, serves to counteract the equally permiSsible ambition of 
the President to determine the composition of the Supreme Court. 
We have already considered the problems associated with the 
political questions doctrine as applied to the question of the scope of 
senatorial inquiry. Somewhat different problems might arise when the 
92. At least as long as the senator is persuaded that the answers fall within the range of 
acceptable professional opinion. 
93. It will not do to say that these considerations make it possible for a nominee to be re-
jected for purely political reasons, for it is precisely the point of the political questions analysis to 
demonstrate that there is nothing constitutionally troubling about rejecting a nominee for such 
reasons. 
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question of confirmation is considered. The difference lies in the fact 
that the confirmation question deals with the substance of the sena-
tor's decision while the scope of inquiry deals with preparatory stages. 
There are several areas of constitutional law where it is clear that 
substantive norms ought to govern the action of representatives even 
though there is no external mechanism, other than an informed 
electorate, to police their action. We have already noticed one: the 
proposition that statutes adopted with the motivation of suppressing 
free speech are constitutionally improper even though the courts will 
not invalidate them.94 Lawrence Sager has discussed another area, 
which he calls the domain of the underenforced constitutional norm.95 
In this domain, there are constitutional norms which the courts fail to 
enforce, in large part because they find themselves under institutional 
limitations that preclude them from effectively enforcing the norms. 
The application of these ideas to the confirmation process must 
proceed by stages. Assume, first, that there is a constitutional norm 
that governs a senator's decision on whether to confirm a nominee to 
the Supreme Court - for example, that a senator should vote to con-
firm any nominee who satisfies the requirements of ability and integ-
rity. 96 Is that norm underenforceable, in the sense that institutional 
limitations preclude courts from examining decisions that violate it? 
There are at the outset obvious difficulties in constructing a lawsuit 
that could properly bring a failure to confirm a nominee into court.97 
Creative lawyering, though, could probably overcome these difficul-
ties. 98 It seems that the only real institutional difficulty is the fig leaf 
problem, in the sense that only that problem cannot be overcome by a 
carefully constructed set of judicially enforceable rules. If constitu-
tional norms regulate the confirmation decision, then they are under-
enforceable in the requisite sense, and a senator could properly be 
criticized for relying on politics rather than on those norms in decid-
ing whether to vote to confirm. 
The real question therefore appears to be whether we can identify 
constitutional norms to regulate the confirmation decision. This 
94. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
95. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenfarced Constitutional Norms, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
96. We should note once again the anomaly of supposing that there is such a standard after 
we have concluded that a senator may properly inquire into a wider range of factors. 
97. And, of course, there ought to be potential lawsuits claiming that a nominee was improp-
erly confirmed, in that senators relied on political considerations in voting to confirm a nominee 
who was not sufficiently able or honest. 
98. For example, one can imagine a lawsuit by the disappointed nominee for wrongfully 
withheld salary (at least if the jurisdictional statutes covered such a claim). 
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brings us back to the earlier discussion of the existence of external 
evaluative standards. Here, as there, it is undoubtedly the case that we 
can devise such norms; the "ability and integrity" example sufficiently 
makes the point. But, here as there, the question recurs whether the 
norms we can devise are sufficiently sensitive to the considerations that 
a sound constitutional order should take into account. Most obvi-
ously, given the central proposition about ambition counteracting am-
bition, the case for allowing senators to consider their predictions 
about the nominee's likely behavior on the Court seems powerful. 
This is so for two reasons. First, it is generally conceded that a Presi-
dent may, though once again he or she need not, take such predictions 
into account in selecting a nominee. Given that concession, a system 
that made it normatively impermissible for a senator to consider such 
predictions would tilt the balance of authority rather strongly in favor 
of the President, undermining the principle of ambition counteracting 
ambition. Second, the Supreme Court is one of the institutions whose 
ambition must be countered. We can think of ambition countering 
ambition as a game of strategy, and surely a sensible player of that 
game would attempt to select opponents whose ambition can be read-
ily countered. Thus, preventing senators from considering a nomi-
nee's likely action on the Supreme Court would distort the system of 
checks and balances by reducing the Senate's power vis-a-vis both the 
President and the Supreme Court. 
All of this does not yet establish, however, that a senator acts prop-
erly in voting on a confirmation solely with reference to electoral con-
siderations, though the fig leaf problem goes a long way toward 
supporting that conclusion. However, perhaps we need only flip the 
question around. In light of the preceding analysis, is there any good 
reason to think that undesirable consequences will flow from allowing 
senators to rely solely on electoral considerations when they vote on 
confirmations? I am hard-pressed to identify such a reason, particu-
larly when we remember that we are considering the behavior of a 
multi-member body, some of whose members will act with reference to 
other considerations. At least, it seems to me, although a senator who 
relies solely on electoral considerations may not behave in the most 
admirable way, he or she does not act in a manner made questionable 
by constitutional norms. 
One final point should be stressed here. When I speak of mere 
political considerations, the natural inference is that we are dealing 
with crass politics, interest group deals, satisfying people who donated 
large amounts of money to a senator's campaign, and the like. Yet, 
that is not all there is, or needs to be, to ordinary politics. Loyalty to 
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one's party or one's President serves valuable political ends too, put-
ting in place institutions that might be able to adopt relatively coher-
ent overall programs of national policy. And, in the end, there is the 
possibility that senators will respond to voters who actually care about 
issues of constitutional principle. That possibility leads to the final 
section of this Essay, which considers the scholar's perspective on 
these problems. 
III. CONCLUSION: THE SCHOLAR'S PERSPECTIVE 
This essay has defended the proposition that in cases involving the 
separation of powers, the Constitution adopts a scheme of pure proce-
dural justice: whatever results from the operation of the political pro-
cess is constitutionally acceptable, and there are no external evaluative 
criteria against which that outcome can be measured. The position 
taken in this essay is strongly democratic, for it relies on the operation 
of democratic processes to produce results and denies that such 
processes are likely to produce normatively troubling outcomes. 
However, this proposition raises two kinds of problems that de-
serve attention. The first is narrowly political. In recent discussions, 
particularly of the Bork nomination, it was Judge Bork's supporters 
who claimed that the political process was insufficiently respectful of 
constitutional norms. Yet, when they come to deal with many ques-
tions of substantive constitutional law - at least outside the context of 
the separation of powers - they appeal to canons of judicial restraint 
whose primary justification is that the political process sufficiently pro-
tects against intrusions on constitutional values. One can, of course, 
distinguish between judicial restraint in the contexts of individual 
rights and the separation of powers, yet, given the obvious imbalances 
between individuals and government compared to the more balanced 
power between President and Congress, the distinction is, one can 
safely say, strongly counterintuitive. Further, the defense of separa-
tion of powers is that it is a structure designed to promote democratic 
liberties. There is something anomalous about invoking judicial re-
view in the area of separation of powers on the ground that an an-
tidemocratic institution is necessary to enhance the working of a 
structure whose purpose is precisely the promotion of democracy.99 
One can capture this narrow political point by saying that Judge 
Bork's supporters have objected to the sort of political behavior that 
they expected Judge Bork to approve if confirmed. 
The second problem with the democratic defense of the political 
99. I owe this point to L. Michael Seidman. 
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questions doctrine is that it is on its face inconsistent with the notion 
that there should be limitations on the operation of democracy and is, 
in that sense, anticonstitutional. This, however, misconceives the na-
ture of the democratic defense. As I have stressed, nothing in the posi-
tion developed here rules out the possibility of an informed and 
principled electorate. Such an electorate would subject its representa-
tives to principled constraints because it was committed to restraints 
on itself. The objection to the concept of political questions developed 
here as anticonstitutional conceives of constitutional restraints as, in 
some sense, coming from the outside. The democratic position, in 
contrast, believes that the most effective constraints are those that 
come from within. 
The democratic position would then seem to prescribe a particular 
role for scholars, which would be to contribute to the development of 
an informed and principled electorate. Yet, here too there is a certain 
anomaly. Consider the scholar who believes that, all things consid-
ered, the constitutional system would work best if senators confined 
their inquiries to a nominee's character and ability. Such a scholar is 
of course free to write articles urging that position as a matter of 
sound policy. Yet, if the scholar is a lawyer, there may be no particu-
lar reason to take his or her views on sound policy more seriously than 
those of political scientists or indeed politicians. The legal scholar's 
comparative advantage may lie in demonstrating that this policy is in 
some important sense dictated by the Constitution - that is, that once 
one examines the ordinary sources for constitutional law, one will find 
that the Constitution requires a restricted scope of senatorial inquiry. 
The analysis developed here suggests that this legal scholar may 
then be caught in a rhetorical trap. For his or her prescriptions to be 
taken seriously, they must be cast in terms of constitutional require-
ments. Yet, I have argued, all the Constitution really requires is that 
politics be given its ordinary range of operation, that ambition be set 
to counteract ambition. In the end, then, there may indeed be no dis-
tinctive contribution that legal scholars can make to the creation of an 
informed and principled electorate, which is the primary guarantor of 
the constitutional system - except, of course, that academic lawyers 
have peculiar rhetorical resources and have come to occupy positions 
of influence in discussions of constitutional structure. To that extent, 
an academic lawyer who adopts the model of the Sophist can continue 
to offer policy prescriptions that will be taken seriously. Whether that 
is an admirable model has been controverted since Socrates. 
